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Deconstructing Libertarian Myths  
About Press Freedom1
Kaarle Nordenstreng
The Nordic countries enjoy top positions in the international rankings of press 
freedom. Although the criteria used in these rankings are open to methodo-
logical as well as political criticism, they nevertheless accord the Nordic coun-
tries a prestigious status. Freedom House2 gives Finland, Norway and Sweden 
the highest score, while Reporters Without Borders3 ranks Finland number 1 
with the rest of the Nordic countries all among the top 10, clearly surpassing 
such countries as the USA and the UK. 
These rankings tend to support – especially among those at the top – an 
uncritical approach to the concept of freedom in general and freedom of the 
media in particular. This is unfortunate, because freedom is more than a con-
cept, especially in the professional and academic circles of journalism. Free-
dom constitutes a paradigm guiding our ways of thinking about media and 
society. Moreover, in our Western tradition, the paradigm of freedom is often 
quite problematic and even biased because it tends to alienate us from ethics 
by suggesting that values are something that intervene in a natural state of 
freedom – that values are obstacles to freedom. This situation calls for critical 
excursions into the concept and paradigm of freedom.
We begin the deconstruction of libertarian myths by reviewing three land-
mark documents of the international community adopted at the United Nations 
(UN) and codifying the media-related freedom as a universal concept. The 
latest is the Millennium Declaration of 2000, while the other two are from the 
1940s: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the Constitution 
of UNESCO of 1945. These documents introduce an idea of media freedom 
that is quite balanced and far from the ultra-libertarian version conventionally 
advocated especially by Western media proprietors – namely, that freedom in 
this field means absence of state control, including legal regulation other than 
safeguards against censorship. Indeed, international law does not support a 
simple notion of negative freedom (freedom from); what is suggested instead 
is a notion of positive freedom (freedom for), whereby freedom is not an end 
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product to be protected as such but a means to ensure other more general 
objectives such as peace and democracy.
We then proceed to examine the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas, 
whereby a free flow of information and ideas will automatically ensure that 
truth will prevail, notably through a mechanism of self-correcting truth. This 
doctrine was shaped in 20th-century America, first in legal and political 
debates between the two World Wars and finally during the Cold War in the 
1950s. Meanwhile, going back to the classics of liberal thought, particularly to 
John Milton’s (1644) Areopagitica and John Stuart Mill’s (1859) On Liberty, it 
turns out that their thinking does not exactly correspond to the later doctrine. 
Hence, it is a myth to take the free marketplace of ideas as part and parcel of 
original liberalism.4 
We conclude by exposing the paradigm of freedom against the notion of 
power as understood in philosophical traditions. This suggests that narrow-
minded advocates of Western freedom are equally fundamentalist as those 
Islamists who are typically named as such. The lesson is a call for continuous 
deconstruction of the freedom paradigm.
Millennium Declaration
A largely overlooked paragraph in the Millennium Declaration of September 
18, 2000, resolves under Chapter V. Human rights, democracy and good gov-
ernance: 
To ensure the freedom of the media to perform their essential role 
and the right of the public to have access to information.5
Here we have an authoritative document of the international community – 
although just a Declaration, not a text of proper international law – that speaks 
literally about the freedom of the media. But how? It is not an abstract freedom 
granted to the media but a call or even an obligation to perform a certain role in 
society and to assist people to gain access to information. It is a concept of pos-
itive freedom to perform a certain role – not a negative freedom from restraint 
to do whatever the media may want to do. The parameters for the “essential 
role” are not specified in the same paragraph, but the Millennium Declaration 
leaves little doubt about what is meant given the preceding four chapters: I. 
Values and principles, II. Peace, security and disarmament, III. Development 
and poverty eradication, IV. Protecting our common environment.
This message is unanimously given in the name of all countries. It stands 
as a universal political opinion of the international community – a concept of 
media freedom in the post-Cold War world.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The famous Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.6
The subject of the right here is “everyone” in the sense of “all human beings” 
(the phrase used in Article 1). Beyond everyone appears only “a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion can be fully realized”, as stipulated in Article 28 (introducing the concept 
of “international order”, which later in the NWICO debate was rejected by 
the Western press freedom advocates). Nothing in Article 19 suggests that the 
institution of the press has any ownership right to this freedom. The word 
“media” appears as an open means for the use of “everyone” to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas. 
In fact, Article 19 stipulates that media should be in the service, if not the 
ownership, of the people. It is a myth that the press and media as an institu-
tion enjoys protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this 
respect, some human rights lobbies, including that bearing the name of Article 
19, have pursued doubtful policies in favour of media proprietors instead of 
individual people.
Pedantically speaking, Article 19 introduces the right of “freedom of opin-
ion and expression”, not “freedom of information” or “free flow of informa-
tion”, let alone “press freedom”. Moreover, it is important to remember that 
the Universal Declaration of 1948 does not constitute proper international law; 
this is done only by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
adopted 18 years later. And document adds to the definition of the Declara-
tion’s Article 19 provision the exercise of this right “carries with it special 
duties and responsibilities” and may be subject to certain restrictions under 
specific circumstances to be provided by law. 
Accordingly, the legal form of what is referred to as “press freedom” includes 
a concept of freedom that is far from the unconditional license to do any-
thing, as is typically suggested by media proprietors and also many journal-
ists. Hence the concept of freedom under human rights turns out to be quite 
qualified and leads us to be wary of the conventional myth.
Actually, all this is an old lesson that has largely been forgotten. It is impor-
tant to relearn this lesson, with teaching materials such as those provided by 
Nordenstreng and Schiller in 1979 (Part 3 with chapters by Eek, Gross, and 
Whitton), Nordenstreng in 1984 (Part 2 on international law and the mass 
kaarle nordenstreng
48
media), and Hamelink in 1994. Moreover, here is a challenge for journalism 
educators to prepare an easy-to-read and up-to-date presentation of the true 
idea of freedom within the context of international law and politics.
Constitution of UNESCO
UNESCO presents itself nowadays typically as a defender of freedom – not 
least press freedom. Its website introduces the relevant sector as follows: 
The Communication and Information Sector (CI) was established in its 
present form in 1990. Its programmes are rooted in UNESCO’s Consti-
tution, which requires the Organization to promote “free flow of ideas 
by word and image”.7
This is a misleading formulation which not only celebrates freedom but disre-
gards its conceptual and philosophical foundation. Let us read carefully what 
UNESCO’s Constitution says about the promotion of “free flow of information 
by word and image”:
1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and secu-
rity by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, 
science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for 
the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of 
race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.
2. To realize this purpose the Organization will: (a) Collaborate in 
the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of 
peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end 
recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to 
promote the free flow of ideas by word and image…8
Here, the free flow of ideas is supposed to serve the mutual knowledge and 
understanding of peoples (Article 2(a)), which for its part is subjected to the 
overriding purpose of contributing to peace and security (Article 1). Thus, 
UNESCO’s constitutional mission is not to promote the free flow as such – as 
a simple and isolated aspect – but to do it to the end of advancing the mutual 
knowledge and understanding of people for the higher cause of peace and 
security. Moreover, Article 2 (a) specifies that UNESCO’s promotion of the free 
flow should take place by means of collaboration and through international 
agreements. It is also noteworthy that Article 1 determines UNESCO’s overall 
mandate to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as affirmed by the UN Charter.
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The conceptual structure of the constitutional stipulation is quite clear, 
with the mandate to promote free flow placed in the third level below (a) 
peace and security and (b) mutual knowledge and understanding of people. 
The reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Article 1 does 
not provide an unconditional license for free flow but rather ties UNESCO’s 
mandate to the general principles of international law as laid down in the UN 
Charter. In fact, here we have a textbook example of the notion of positive 
freedom – free flow serving other objectives (freedom for) instead of being an 
end of itself as the notion of negative freedom is understood (freedom from).
Reading UNESCO’s contemporary presentations of itself in the CI sector 
leads one to wonder whether the Constitution has been forgotten since 1990 
– the end of the Cold War. To put it more bluntly, UNESCO seems to have 
departed from its legitimate constitutional mandate by elevating freedom of 
information as a top priority with a self-serving objective. For example, under 
the theme Freedom of Expression, the text reads: “UNESCO promotes free-
dom of expression and freedom of the press as a basic human right….” Here 
and elsewhere, “press” has appeared as the subject of freedom without it 
being mentioned anywhere in the Constitution or other proper sources of 
international law.
To be fair to contemporary UNESCO, one should concede that the banner 
on the main website says: “Building peace in the minds of men and women.”9 
Moreover, the blame for misleading formulations goes not only to the Sec-
retariat headed by the Director-General but ultimately to the Member States 
under whose guidance the organization operates.
It is not difficult to find an explanation for UNESCO’s departure from its 
constitutional line. It wanted to get rid of its reputation as a fellow traveler of 
the socialist and authoritarian regimes that had developed in the West along 
with an anti-imperialist drive in the 1970s. This drive had given rise to such 
concepts as New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) as 
well as to such achievements as the International Commission for the Study 
of Communication Problems (MacBride et al. 1980). By adopting freedom as 
a leading theme, especially in the media field, UNESCO draws a dividing line 
at the world before 1990 – with its division into three worlds, including the 
socialist bloc of the East and the Non-Aligned Movement of the South. Enter-
ing a new millennium UNESCO presents itself as purified from the burdens 
of the past. Psychologically, this may be understandable as treatment of a 
trauma, but it is fatally wrong in terms of UNESCO’s constitutional status and 
role in international politics. By wrapping its IC sector in a freedom banner, 
UNESCO has dissociated itself from its basic mandate and supported the myth 
that its mission is unconditional free flow. To use an old metaphor: The baby 
has gone out with the bath water.
kaarle nordenstreng
50
To understand what has happened at UNESCO, one needs to recall the his-
tory of the anti-imperialist drive of the 1970s. It was part and parcel of a more 
fundamental development in the global arena with landmarks such as the 
UN resolutions on a New International Economic Order and equating Zion-
ism with racism. During this radical period in international politics, UNESCO 
made history by producing the Mass Media Declaration and the MacBride 
Report and setting up the International Programme for the Development of 
Communication. It is remarkable that all this was done by diplomatic consen-
sus, although the “great media debate” in the 1970s went through war-like 
stages of a “decolonization offensive” and a “Western counterattack” before 
reaching a “truce” (Mansell & Nordenstreng 2006). 
What followed after these stages is crucial to understand UNESCO’s trau-
matic relationship to freedom of information. Ronald Reagan’s advent as presi-
dent in early 1981 turned the United States from multilateralism to a unilateral 
employment of power politics, with a relative weakening of the USSR and the 
Non-Aligned Movement. The truce of the late 1970s was followed by a new 
Western offensive in the 1980s. At this stage, all the elements of compromise 
that were earlier regarded as valuable and honorable went suddenly out of 
fashion and even turned into liability risks, such as NWICO (Nordenstreng 
2012). 
In a still broader historical context, UNESCO’s current approach to the free 
flow of information means a return to what Americans had been forging to 
push onto its agenda since its foundation in 1945 and that largely figured in 
its communication policies in the 1950s and 1960s – regardless of what the 
Constitution said. As Herbert Schiller (1976) has shown, the American doctrine 
of free flow of information has an ironic prehistory between the two World 
Wars when Associated Press (AP) used it as an argument in encroaching the 
territories of British and French news agencies Reuters and Havas. Referring 
to American expansionism, the British Economist noted that Kent Cooper, 
the executive manager of AP, “like most big business executives, experiences 
a peculiar moral glow in finding that his idea of freedom coincides with his 
commercial advantage” (Schiller 1976: 29). In the early 1940s, the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors proposed to the U.S. Congress that it support 
“world freedom of information and unrestricted communications of news 
throughout the world” (ibid: 31). This lobbying was successful to the point 
that John Foster Dulles, one of the chief architects of the American Cold War 
policy after 1945, declared: “If I were to be granted one point in foreign policy 
and no other, I would make it the free flow of information” (ibid: 30).
Despite the initial hesitancy among the European allies, the doctrine of free 
flow of information became indeed a central element in the common Western 
arsenal of the Cold War. It found its way also to UNESCO, although, as shown 
by Joseph Mehan (1981), Americans did not succeed in totally turning the 
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organization into an instrument of the Cold War. A muted but still noticeable 
line in keeping with the Western free flow doctrine continued until the 1970s, 
when it was challenged by the anti-imperialist drive. Schiller wrote his disarm-
ing historical review at this time in the mid-1970s, suggesting that the Ameri-
can hegemony was on the decline, giving way to a more balanced notion of 
free flow, whereby the developing world would also have its fair share. Today, 
we can say that Schiller was wrong and American domination is back again. 
The lesson from this history is, first, that free flow of information has 
never been a neutral and ecumenical concept but rather a tactical argument 
in socioeconomic and ideological struggles. Second, the constitutional mis-
sion of UNESCO, based on a text drafted in the idealistic spirit toward the 
end of World War II, was contradictory to the free flow doctrine created in 
the United States and turned into a Cold War instrument. Third, by following 
the free flow doctrine, UNESCO deviated from its constitutional mission until 
the 1970s, when the Mass Media Declaration, the MacBride Commission, and 
NWICO brought it back on track. As we know, this turn back to basics was 
only short lived and was derailed by political shifts in the world since the 
1980s.
Legacy of Liberalism
Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) summarize libertarian theory in Four 
Theories of the Press as follows:
The libertarian theory of the function of the mass media in a demo-
cratic society has had a long and arduous history. This history has 
paralleled the development of democratic principles in govern-
ment and free enterprise in economics. The theory itself can trace 
a respected lineage among the philosophers of ancient times, but 
it received its greatest impetus from the developments in western 
Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From Milton to 
Holmes it has stressed the superiority of the principle of individual 
freedom and judgement and the axiom that truth when allowed free 
rein will emerge victorious from any encounter. Its slogans have been 
the “self-righting process” and the “free market place of ideas.” It has 
been an integral part of the great march of democracy which has 
resulted in the stupendous advancement of the well-being of human-
ity. It has been the guiding principle of western civilization for more 
than two hundred years. (p. 70)
This text more than anything else has fueled the myth that the idea of a free 
marketplace of ideas with its mechanism of self-righting truth belongs to the 
kaarle nordenstreng
52
core of liberalism based on Milton and Mill. The Four Theories of the Press 
became a baseline for thinking about the media systems in the world as it 
filled a gap in textbooks on journalism and mass communication. However, its 
huge popularity was not substantiated by a corresponding weight in scholar-
ship, as shown by Last Rights (Nerone 1995), which critically revisited the Four 
Theories of the Press – both coming from the same College of Communications 
at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.
In point of fact, the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas with a self-right-
ing truth, as it keeps circulating in contemporary professional and academic 
discourse, cannot be found in the works of Milton and Mill. Although these 
classics of liberalism used the market metaphor, it was not understood as an 
appropriate way for individuals to approach the world of ideas. Actually, both 
were aghast at the prospect of ideas being treated as if they were goods to 
be bought and sold in a market. They surely advocated freedom of thought 
and speech without prior censorship, but the concept of a free marketplace of 
ideas had no strategic place in their thinking. They also recognized the power 
of truth over a candid mind but only under fair circumstances – something not 
necessarily guaranteed by the media marketplace.
The following two sentences from Milton’s pamphlet Areopagitica are usu-
ally quoted as proof that he is the father of the concept of self-correcting truth:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the 
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and 
prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; 
who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? 
(Altschull 1990: 40)
Milton’s main point was to oppose the licensing and censorship of printing. 
He insisted that all kinds of views should be allowed to be brought to the 
public and allowed to clash without hindrance. His philosophical view would 
nowadays be called a maxim of pluralism, whereby we would not find the 
truth without also encountering falsehood. Milton was passionately opposed 
to forbidding anything to be published, comparing censorship to murder: “He 
who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God.” In his 
main work, Paradise Lost, Milton (1667) elaborated the struggle between truth 
and falsehood and made a fervent appeal to challenge official truths, including 
God’s commandments, with an invitation even to commit sins as a means to 
acquire knowledge and achieve human growth and development. 
Accordingly, truth will not automatically prevail but must be cultivated in an 
active and radical process. This view is simply incompatible with the concept 
of self-righting truth. In short, Milton cannot be taken as an early advocate of 
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market liberalism: “Call him radical, call him puritan, call him republican, but 
do not call him (neo)liberal” (Peters 2005, p. 72).
The myth about Milton as a source of the doctrine of a free marketplace 
of ideas and self-righting truth began to emerge in the trial of Thomas Paine 
in absentia held in the late 18th century. Paine, author of The Rights of Man 
(1791) and activist in both the American and French revolutions, was accused 
in Britain of inciting revolution in his native country, whose elite was furi-
ous about the revolutionary ideas. Paine’s defense lawyer, Thomas Erskine, 
used Milton’s Areopagitica to prove that no good government needed to be 
afraid of open discussion. In his argumentation, Erskine twisted Milton’s point 
toward the concept of self-righting truth. This argument availed nothing in 
the proceedings against Paine, but it brought about an erroneous version of 
Milton’s thinking (Keane 1991). 
John Stuart Mill, who had minutely scrutinized what Milton had written two 
centuries earlier, shared the position about the free encounter of ideas and the 
inadmissibility of censorship. His On Liberty is a fine elaboration of the same 
theme, but it does not include the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas. The 
rest of Mill’s production is likewise void in this respect. For a liberal, he was 
far from dogmatic about the role of the state, considering that state interven-
tion may well be necessary in ensuring social justice and other higher values. 
Also, the freedom of opinion and its expression was not for Mill an end in 
itself; he viewed it as “the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on 
which all their other well-being depends)”, as he expressed the ultimate objec-
tive in his summary of the grounds for pursuing this freedom.
As to the concept of self-righting truth, Mill actually held a contrary view, 
whereby it was quite possible that truth failed to prevail in a free encounter 
and falsehood became a dominant public opinion. In On Liberty, he dismissed 
the concept of self-righting truth as “pleasant falsehood”. Later Mill had bitter 
personal experience of how falsehood may prevail: With his wife, Harriet 
Taylor-Mill, he fought for women’s emancipation but failed to gain broader 
support and even became an object of ridicule, finally losing his seat in Par-
liament. 
Consequently, it is a myth that the standard justification for press free-
dom by the doctrine of free marketplace of ideas comes from the classics of 
liberalism. Milton and Mill do not provide direct support for contemporary 
neoliberalism and cannot be taken as the basis for a libertarian theory of the 
press. The legacy of original liberalism represents rather social democracy 
and corresponds to a social responsibility theory of the press proposed by the 
Hutchins Commission in the United States (A Free and Responsible Press 1947). 
The concept of freedom in the original liberal philosophy was positive rather 
than negative: freedom for something, not freedom from something.
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Where, then, are the roots of the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas 
apart from the trial of Thomas Paine in the 1790s? An often-quoted source 
in the literature is the proceedings in 1919 against Russian emigrants in New 
York accused of distributing anti-American leaflets (supporting the socialist 
revolution of 1917). In this process, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to 
“free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” (Peters 2004: 71). 
However, as John Durham Peters points out, this is not literally speaking the 
doctrine and slogan of a free marketplace of ideas. 
Peters (2004) traces the first uses of the phrase “free marketplace of ideas” 
to the pages of The New York Times in the routine political discourse of the 
1930s, but a more profound occurrence before the 1948 Congressional election 
campaign comes from an unusual quarter: the communist party of the United 
States, which wanted to campaign “in a free marketplace of ideas”. Obviously, 
American leftists employed the slogan as a defense against rising anticom-
munism. However, Peters (2004) shows that the Cold War context soon turned 
around the political sponsorship of the slogan and that, already in 1953, The 
New York Times uses it as an argument against the East European countries 
that had censorship to prevent the emergence of a free marketplace of ideas.
In addition to this Cold War context, the free marketplace doctrine should 
also be seen as a politically appropriate response to the development of media 
structures in late capitalism. Because the commercialized and concentrated 
media market no longer guaranteed genuine competition of ideas, as done 
in the early modern era with several competing newspapers in a town, the 
monopolized media declared themselves a virtual marketplace of ideas.
It was in this intellectual and political climate that the doctrine of free mar-
ketplace of ideas, with the principle of self-correcting truth, became ingrained 
in the libertarian theory of the Four Theories of the Press. Accordingly, it is 
correct to say, as suggested by Nerone (1995), that this theoretical construct is 
built on an ideological ground of a later day and has little in common with the 
legacy of original liberalism. Admittedly, this myth also has been discovered 
by other experts of the history of liberalism (e.g., Pole 2000). However, given 
its popularity among professional journalists and media proprietors, it needs 
to be constantly exposed.
Freedom in Perspective
Consequently, we can trace a centuries-long historical line from the early 
modern age to the postmodern world, with a surprisingly coherent idea of 
freedom of information. In this context, liberalism is not a partisan ideol-
ogy hijacked by U.S. diplomacy but a balanced philosophy that is far from 
outdated. In media philosophies, the original liberal tradition stands closer 
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to what was advocated by the Hutchins Commission in the 1940s than to the 
manifestos of the World Press Freedom Committee10 in the 1970-80s.
It is instructive to view the paradigm of freedom against the philosophi-
cal traditions that can be traced behind the notion of power. In short, there 
are two fundamentally different notions of power: a Hobbesian view and a 
Hegelian view. The first of these traditions follows Thomas Hobbes and the 
Galilean metaphor of a universe of freely moving objects, including human 
beings and their will – free meaning absence of external impediments of 
motion. In this tradition, power means intervention against free movement – 
power is the capacity to block free movement. The latter tradition, for its part, 
follows the Kantian philosophy, whereby human beings are determined not 
only by the laws of nature but also by moral reasoning. Marxism later shared 
more or less the same philosophy. In this tradition, freedom means autonomy 
from nature and is based on the rational and moral capacity of human beings; 
freedom “is not the ability to act according to one’s will and interest without 
being intervened, but rather is almost exactly the opposite – it is the placing 
of natural desires and interests in a position in which they are governed by 
moral judgments” (Pulkkinen 2000: 12). 
The Hobbes–Galilean tradition defines politics as a game between atom-
istic individuals, whereas the Hegelian–Marxist tradition understands politics 
as an organic part of a society, where power is not the relation between two 
individuals but “an instrument of justice in the process of the self-control of 
society” (Pulkkinen 2000: 94). The former “libertarian” tradition introduces 
an ontology, where power appears as a fairly simple (negative) element, with 
freedom as its (positive) opposition. The latter, “communitarian tradition”, for 
its part, has an ontology, where power is not an obstacle distracting natural 
movement but an essential instrument to ensure morality and order in civil 
society and ultimately in the state. In this tradition, power and freedom are far 
from simple and mechanistic notions, and therefore this tradition is intellectu-
ally more demanding and challenging than the standard libertarian version.
A textbook case for deconstructing the notion of media freedom is pro-
vided by the worldwide debate that followed after the Danish newspaper, 
Jyllands-Posten, published provocative caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed 
in fall 2005. An international study compiled 14 national reviews of the way 
freedom of speech was understood in the political and professional debates 
on the cartoon controversy (Kunelius et al. 2007; Kunelius & Alhassan 2008). 
After empirically examining the free speech rhetoric in a number of media in 
these countries the study introduces a framework with two underlying dimen-
sions of the debate as shown in Figure 1. One dimension defines the notion 
of freedom of speech, ranging from a universal value of absolutist freedom 
to a culture-specific value of relativist freedom. The other dimension defines 
the nature of communication, ranging from a national sphere where dialogue 
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Figure 1. Basic Dimensions Behind Freedom Discourses
Freedom of speech 
as a universal value (Modernity)
 Communication,  Communication,
 dialogue and dialogue and
 deliberation deliberation 
 within cultures across cultures 
 and identities and identities
Freedom of speech 
as a relativist value (Post-modernity)
Source: Kunelius et al. 2007: 17.
Figure 2. Four Extreme Positions in Terms on Freedom of Speech
 Liberal  Liberal
 “fundamentalism” Universalism pragmatism
 Identity  Dialogue
 Religious or ethnic Contextualism Dialogic
 “fundamentalism”  multiculturalism
Source: Kunelius and Alhassan 2008: 90.
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and deliberation take place within cultures and identities to a global sphere 
where dialogue and deliberation take place across cultures and identities. 
Seen against these dimensions, four extreme positions are distinguished as 
shown in Figure 2.
Those Islamists who attacked the media and countries where the carica-
tures were published naturally held a relativist view of press freedom and were 
placed in the national/culture-centered end of the communication dimension, 
without respect for a global dialogue between cultures. However, those West-
ern press freedom advocates, who insisted that publishing of the cartoons can 
under no circumstances be denied on grounds of principle, were typically 
found in the same end of the communication dimension with the Islamists, 
placing themselves beyond reflection and thus turning against the idea of 
liberty as an open and tolerant approach. Thus, there are “fundamentalists” 
among both liberal and religious camps. For the freedom advocates, this is a 
bitter lesson that has not proceeded well in the site of the study – rather, the 
extreme libertarians in Finland have chosen a defensive strategy by accusing 
the study of condoning censorship.
Yet, the lesson must go on as freedom applied to media is a notoriously 
problematic concept. Moreover, it is a deceptively ideological concept – espe-
cially when understood to be simple and apolitical. We must therefore be 
alert and critical in order to avoid ideological traps – and complacency fed 
by top rankings in international comparisons. After all, we are always bound 
to a certain tradition, and our thinking with all its concepts and paradigms is 
constructed rather than inherently given.
On the other hand, a critical approach to the topic does not suggest that 
the idea of freedom – in general or applied to media – should be undermined 
or suspected. On the contrary, freedom of thought, expression, and media is 
cherished as a vital element in the lives of individuals as well as societies. It 
is precisely because of its great value that freedom should not be allowed to 
degenerate into an ideological instrument, as has too often been the case. To 
disprove the old myths and avoid the emergence of new ones, it is important 
that freedom, and the lack of it, remain under constant debate.
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7A Brief Introduction
In recent years there has been widespread concern about the ability of the 
media to maintain and develop their role as a pillar of democracy. A precon-
dition for true democracy is well-informed citizens and the right to freedom 
of expression and freedom of information, and that can only exist where the 
press and internet are free and pluralism and independence of media are 
secure. 
Internet and the ongoing digitization have transformed media landscapes 
and in turn the social functions of media and the structure of both governance 
and markets as new kinds of transnational companies have emerged. Issues 
regarding freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of the 
press are more complex than ever. 
Examples of new forms of political censorship, monitoring and control, 
gatekeeping, disinformation, terrorism laws, threats to journalists and other, 
as well as commercially motivated hindrances to these freedoms are, unfortu-
nately, commonplace. Freedom of expression, privacy and security are closely 
interrelated. 
Traditional media and their various platforms on the Internet and mobile 
telephony operate today in contexts that are quite different from those that 
prevailed when most of the fundamental declarations and resolutions regard-
ing media and human rights were adopted on the global arena: The UN Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, The UNESCO Constitution of 1946, 
the Universal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, and UNESCO’s 
Resolution 29: Condemnation of Violence against Journalists of 1997. 
Despite the passage of time, these documents continue to express the prin-
ciples of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, with an emphasis 
on pluralism and independence of the media – both offline and online. The 
principles of freedom of expression and press freedom must be technology-
neutral.
Advances in technology and changes in the political and social context 
in which the digital technologies operate give rise, however, to a number of 
dilemmas, and these in turn demand new approaches and strategies to ensure 
the full and proper application of these fundamental freedoms. A number of 
challenges have to be taken into account if we are to succeed in resolving 
complex issues of freedom of expression, not least those involving freedom of 
the press, in ways that prevent the erosion of these freedoms and, ultimately, 
the erosion of human rights.
The communication society of today has an enormous potential to add to 
and advance democracy, human rights and social justice – not least globally. 
8We gain access to information and knowledge that not so many years ago 
were beyond our horizons, and we can make our voices heard in numerous 
possible ways. 
There are, however, some powerful constraints. In order to be able to make 
use of these freedoms, citizens have to have some education and be of good 
health. Thus, many groups of people living in poverty are unable to use their 
rights. They often face social inequality, poor schools, gender discrimination, 
unemployment and inadequate health systems. People caught up in war and 
violent unrest are especially vulnerable. Millions of people have been driven 
from their homes and have no civil rights whatsoever. 
Many of the researchers who have devoted themselves to problems of 
development and political legitimacy, and what can be done to eradicate pov-
erty and corruption – two prime “enemies” to these fundamental rights – are 
agreed as to the need for “clean government” with a concern for human wel-
fare. They focus not only on formal political institutions, but also on informal 
institutions having to do with trust and traditions of cooperation. These, too, 
must be taken into consideration.
In many societies some people fear that globalization poses a mortal 
threat to their society’s and culture’s uniqueness and see media as agents 
of a globalized cultural sphere. The fearful take measures to defend their 
identities, and when common cultural platforms can no longer be maintained, 
stockades are raised around local cultures, religious beliefs and communities. 
Thus, while horizons broaden, the world also seems to retreat further from us. 
Transcendence of boundaries and defense of boundaries are twin aspects 
of the globalization process. Globalization processes force us not only to focus 
more on transnational phenomena in general, but also to highlight difference. 
Thus, globalization calls for regional epistemologies. 
The Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – 
are kindred in many respects, including their media systems. All share long 
traditions of protecting freedom of expression and freedom of the press in 
constitutional law; public service broadcasting; state subsidy systems to insure 
pluralism in the press; early development of ICT; and not least a long tradition 
of mass literacy. 
The Nordic countries also rate high on indexes of democracy, welfare, 
absence of corruption and other such indicators – characteristics that, taken 
together, are often referred to as “the Nordic model”. In this era of globaliza-
tion, however, the Nordic countries are undergoing change on many fronts. 
Extensive deregulation has changed the relationship between government, 
the market and the citizens. Furthermore, once homogeneous populations 
are today truly multicultural. From the point of view of welfare politics and 
democratic processes, these changes pose numerous challenges.
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regions in the world. People in these countries have enormous possibilities 
to exchange information and to make their voices heard, which bodes well 
for the future of democracy. But, there is also a risk in the form of widening 
gaps in our societies in terms of knowledge. Media use in the Nordic countries 
has become increasingly fragmented, differentiated and individualized. The 
conditions under which media operate have changed, and so, too, the “public 
sphere”, so essential to democracy. Critical, independent journalism is now an 
endangered species. 
Nonetheless, all too often public discussions of the media are concerned 
more with business models than with safeguarding professional journalism 
– ultimately it is about the press freedom and freedom of expression upon 
which it rests. And all too often the ‘top-down’ perspective of politics and the 
industry collides with the ‘bottom-up’ perspective of the network culture. 
This situation has far-reaching implications for the research community.   
There is an urgent need to broaden the context in which freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of information and press freedom are conceptualized.  A much 
more holistic approach is called for if progress is to be made. As researchers 
we need to revive our curiosity and explore the new phenomena in society 
around us.
In 2009 Nordicom published Freedom of Speech Abridged? Cultural, Legal 
and Philosophical Challenges, an anthology that focused on the traditional 
concept of individual freedom of expression. A media perspective was a key 
element in most of the articles. The book was edited by two Norwegian 
researchers, Anine Kierulf and Helge Rønning, and the essays presented were 
written by researchers and authors working in the Nordic countries. More than 
four years later, we see that this book has reached large numbers of readers 
around the world. 
The present volume, Freedom of Expression Revisited. Citizenship and Jour-
nalism in the Digital Era, may be seen as a follow-up to this earlier title. The 
articles in it arise out of collaboration among Nordic scholars around among 
other things an international symposium held in conjunction with the Hana-
saari International Freedom of Expression Days in Finland in December 2012. 
The theme of this symposium might be summarized as critical perspectives 
on Nordic experiences and conceptions of freedom of expression and the 
media, formulated in the question: Do the Nordic countries have anything to 
contribute to global discussions of freedom of expression, press freedom and 
the role of journalists in contemporary communication societies? 
From Nordicom’s view it is most important to understand the principle of 
freedom of expression and communication rights from different standpoints 
in various parts of the world. This is an absolute prerequisite to any robust 
scientific inquiry into the field on a global scale. 
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There is a need for a more coherent, comprehensive understanding – a call 
for greater internationalization of media studies. We need more collaboration 
– within our field, with other disciplines, with society around us and across 
national frontiers. We need to learn more from one another, to share knowl-
edge and context. We have to maintain and further develop national and 
regional collaboration, not least as a means to ensure that internationalization 
does not take place at the expense of knowledge about, and reflection on, 
scholars’ own societies and cultures. 
Fruitful national and regional dialogues are a great boon in international 
exchanges, and vice versa. It is therefore my hope that this book may con-
tribute knowledge and reflections of value to the discussion of freedom of 
expression and press freedom.
Finally, I should like to thank all those who have contributed the fruits of 
their research and their reflections on the complex and often controversial 
issues relating to freedom of expression, citizenship and the role of journalism 
in digital cultures.
Göteborg in August 2013
Ulla Carlsson
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